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Abstract. Quantum-like models can be fruitfully used to model atti-
tude change in a social context. Next steps require data, and higher
dimensional models. Here, we discuss an exploratory study that demon-
strates an order eect when three question sets about Climate Beliefs,
Political Aliation and Attitudes Towards Science are presented in dif-
ferent orders within a larger study of n = 533 subjects. A quantum-like
model seems possible, and we propose a new experiment which could be
used to test between three possible models for this scenario.
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1 Modelling Attitude Change in a Social Context
How do the attitudes of a population vary according to its social makeup? Un-
derstanding the manner in which the social context of an individual will inu-
ence their attitudes is a dicult problem, but highly important. Privately held
attitudes play a critical role in people's personal choices about their health, ed-
ucation, social groups, and housing, as well as the importance they attribute to
national issues such as the environment, immigration and state security [1].
However, the way in which people express their attitudes is highly contex-
tual. How will a given person think about `global warming' vs `climate change'?
What if their daughter has just had her house ooded? Or if they are about to
make a very large tax payment that includes a carbon component? People's atti-
tudes are not static immutable objects, but change in response to persuasion [2],
and attempts to maintain cognitive consistency [3]. We often express dierent
attitudes in accordance with the social context we nd ourselves in [4], and it is
frequently the case that an explicitly expressed attitude is quite dierent from an
internally held one [5]. As a further complication, many factors beyond the social
setting itself are involved, from worldviews and cognitive styles [6{8], through
to more traditionally studied factors such as education and demographics.
This complexity makes attitude change and opinion formation very dicult
to model. While dual process models exist (such as the Elaboration Likelyhood
Model (ELM) [9]; and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) [10]), this paper
demonstrates a framing eect [11] which such models struggle to explain.
In the following section we will briey introduce a model of attitude change
that has been developed by two of us (Kitto & Boschetti) which uses a quantum-
like approach. This model shows promise of unifying a number of cognitive vari-
ables into one consistent model of attitude change. Testing this model will require
datasets which combine a number of variables which are not traditionally col-
lected together, and for this reason, section 2 will introduce some preliminary
results from an extensive survey recently collected in the Australian context.
We will show that there is evidence to believe that a weak order eect is at
work when subjects are asked about their attitudes to science, politics and cli-
mate change. This leads us to propose an experimental scenario which could test
between a collection of classical, quantum and quantum-like models.
1.1 A Quantum-like Model of Attitude Change
A recent set of papers by the authors [12{14] have proposed a quantum-like
model of attitude change, which allows for a natural explanation of framing
eects. More details can be found in those papers, but in brief, this model makes
use of the following key concepts.
The cognitive state jAi of an agent A is represented as a vector in a Hilbert
space. This state is an objective feature of the model (i.e. it is a representation
of how the agent currently thinks) but it cannot be objectively recovered (i.e. it
can only be measured within a social context, or framing of an issue).
The framing of a social issue is represented by the choice of orthonormal basis
states (e.g. fj0ip; j1ipg) which mathematically represent the cognitive state in
that context. Within the particular frame (represented by p) used to denote an
issue under consideration by the agent A, the state j1ip denotes a case where the
agent is in complete agreement with that interpretation of the issue, and j0ip
the case where they completely disagree. The current model utilises two types
of frame; a local frame which represents the way an agent understands the issue
under consideration, and global frames, which represent the combined attitudes
of a particular social group (currently generated using a k-means style clustering
algorithm [14]).
The personality of individual agents is modelled using two parameters which
specify the psychological need that an agent A feels for cognitive consistency,
0 < wi(A) < 1, (i.e. making decisions that are highly correlated, or consistent,
with their current cognitive state) and social cohesion, 0 < ws(A) < 1, (i.e. a bias
towards making decisions that are similar to those of the social group to which
A currently belongs, allowing A to `t in' with their current social context).
These weights can range over a population of agents, providing a rough social
parameterisation, and should match data about the society under consideration
in the model. Thus, a society that values social conformity is likely to have
more agents with a high ws(A) value, and one which values individualism would
consist of more agents with a high wi(A), but other scenarios can be imagined.
The model then considers the orientation of each agent's local frame to result
from an attempt to navigate these two dierent drives, which may prove to
compete with one another in the mind of the agent. Far more details about
these parameters are provided in [13], but it is important to realise that they
are not xed. Introducing more frames will require more parameters (in order to
model the time dynamics as they are introduced in (2)), and which ones to use
must be a modelling decision. Is the model aiming to describe group cohesion vs
individualism? In this case the above two parameters would be a logical choice.
However, in a model that was aiming to describe attitudes to work then it might
be more appropriate to use personality variables derivative from the \big-5" [15],
or even something else.
Cognitive dissonance [3] suggests that agents who make decisions that are
very dierent from their current cognitive states will experience a feeling of dis-
comfort which may cause them to alter their cognitive state. We make use of
Binary entropy, H(P )   P log2 P   (1   P ) log2(1   P ), as a measure of this
discomfort, where P is the probability of an agent making a decision given their
current cognitive state and the context in which they are currently making that
decision. Agents have a propensity (dependent upon their personality parame-
ters) to align their cognitive states towards their current framing of a problem.
Thus, agents are driven to update their cognitive state to align more closely with
their decisions if they have a high consistency, and to update their individual
framing of a problem to a closer alignment with the global frame to which they
currently identify if they have a high need for social cohesion. Dening  as
the angle between the agent's current state jAi, and the j1i axis in their current
global context, and  as performing a similar function in their local frame, allows
for the specication of an entropy measure for each agent [14]
H(jAi; ; ) = wi(A)Hb(P ()) + ws(A)Hb(P ()): (1)
Depending upon the social dynamics to be described the system is then
updated in time, with agents making decisions, and then updating their cognitive
states and individual framings of an issue to reect the decisions made, their
social context, and their personality variables [14].
If the decision was in the local frame, then only the cognitive state of the
agent is updated (within the local frame). Thus, an agent who has made a
decision within a certain framing of a problem will shift their state towards the
decision (`yes' or `no', represented by j1ip and j0ip respectively) that they made
in the context (denoted by p). The size of this shift is dened as dependent upon
two factors: (1) the personality prole of the agent (given in this case as wi, as
it represents the desire of an agent to align their cognitive state with their local
frame); (2) the angle . Writing 0 for the angle between the agent's state and
the j0pi axis, and 1 for the angle between their state and the j1pi axis, the new
angle between the agent's state and the frame will become:
if A decides

to act: 1(jAit+1; w(A)) = 1(jAti) w(A)
not to act: 0(jAit+1; w(A)) = 0(jAti) w(A) (2)
where w(A) depends upon the comfort of A with holding an attitude that is
dissonant from their decision. Thus, for this update process w(A) = wi(A).
Agents who make a decision that agrees with the attitude expressed in that
frame will thus experience a rotation of their cognitive state by a certain distance
dependent upon their personality towards the j1pi axis (recall that  is the
distance between the j1pi axis and the current state of the agent jAi), and agents
who disagree with that attitude will experience a rotation of their cognitive state
in the opposite direction.
If the decision was made in the global frame, then both the cognitive state
of the agent and their local frame are updated (with reference to their global
frame). Thus, in addition to the update of the cognitive state that is represented
in equation (2), the local frame of the agent will shift towards the global axis
that represents the decision made by the agent. The amount by which the local
frame shifts is given by an equivalent version of equation (2), thus the new
angle between the local frame and the global frame is given by (2), but with
w(A) = ws(A).
Over time, we expect the agents to self-organise towards a scenario where
they are highly aligned within groups who all hold similar ideologies (or global
frames). This process can be measured by the total entropy of the system, given
by a summation of each agent's individual entropy
H =
NX
i=1
H(jii; i; i): (3)
1.2 Alternative Quantum Inspired Models
We note that a few other models exist which could be used to model the same
complex social scenarios. One example is a dynamic update semantics which
uses non-commutative logics to describe changes in epistemic states in a society
of agents [16{19]. These models take a formal approach to quantum logic, and so
can be classied as pure classical and/or quantum models. Similarly, standard
Quantum Decision Theory [20] can also be adapted to the modelling of attitude
change. In section 3 we will consider the QQ-model due to Wang & Busemeyer
[21] which like all of these models precisely matches standard quantum time
evolution. This model provides a very strong test which must be satised by any
quantum inspired model which matches the standard quantum axioms. This will
lead us to the possibility of testing between classical, quantum, and the weaker
quantum-like model presented above.
2 Attitudes to Climate Change, Science and Politics
Understanding how such a model will work in a realistic setting requires an
extensive data set. We must be able to connect personality data with a Hilbert
space representation of attitudes, and to then nd a way in which to connect
this space to measurement outcomes. In particular, the way in which order of
presentation might change expressed attitudes must be studied, as this would
start to provide an indication as to what the topology of attitude space might
be. For example, should we expect the cognitive state of an individual to lie
in one large n-dimensional Hilbert space? Or should attitudes lie in a set of
incompatible subspaces and so exhibit order eects? Perhaps the spaces are
more than incompatible, and cannot be framed in the same space at all? (As for
example the momentum of an electron and its spin are modelled in two dierent
Hilbert spaces.)
Many possible scenarios could be examined, but some have been attract-
ing more interest than others of late, and so already have extensive datasets
available. For example, the complex nexus of climate belief and worldviews has
attracted considerable interest in recent years [7, 22, 6], and provides an interest-
ing link between many variables that could prove useful to testing and extending
this model. Of particular interest to the current model, a set of results have been
obtained demonstrating a strong link between attitudes to climate change and
the expressed worldview of a subject [7]. According to this cultural cognition
thesis, personality types that can be classied as egalitarian and communitarian
tend to worry about environmental risks such as climate change, while individ-
ualists tend to reject such claims of environmental risk (worrying instead about
too much governmental control). Due to the current imperative to understand
the attitudes of populations to climate change a large amount of data is being
generated, and so many opportunities exist to create new models of attitude
change in this setting. Here, we will discuss one recent survey which explored
the attitudes held by the Australian public towards Climate Change, Science,
and Politics. This section will introduce one particular result from that study, as
it seems to hold promise for exhibiting quantum-like eects. Later sections will
make explicit predictions about what a secondary follow up study would nd.
2.1 An Australian 2013 Election Survey
The survey used was adapted from one that was originally developed to study
attitudes towards environmental issues in the general public with the intention of
helping scientists to better design communication and engagement processes [6].
That paper reports upon the full set of scales probing cognitive styles, political
ideologies, worldviews and environmental attitudes etc. that were explored in
the survey. The surveys were run at three dierent times: a) in 2011, b) in 2013,
a few weeks before the Australian General Election and c) in 2013, a few weeks
after the Australian General Election. The description and analysis of the 2011
survey can be found in [6], where each cognitive construct is described. A full
analysis of the 2013 surveys is currently under way. In order to explore the ways
in which framing a question might aect the resultant attitudes, the 2013 surveys
were administered in 4 dierent orders of presentation.
Climate Beliefs: This question asked respondents \What best describes
your thoughts about climate change?" with possible choices: \I don't think that
climate change is happening", \I have no idea whether climate change is hap-
pening or not", \I think that climate change is happening, but it's a natural
uctuation in Earth's temperatures", \I think it is happening and I think that
humans are largely causing it". This question is taken from [22], where a record
of responses over the last 4 years is discussed. Two other questions were also
added to this section the survey in an attempt to gain further insight into the
responses obtained: (1) \How important is the issue of climate change to you?"
and (2) \How certain are you of your own position on climate change?" with re-
sponses ranging through fVery Unimportant, Moderately Important, Important,
Important, Very Importantg and fExtremely Uncertain, Uncertain, Moderately
Certain, Certain, Extremely Certaing respectively.
Political Aliation: \On the following scale, please indicate how you iden-
tify your political views" with choices: fVery liberal, Moderately liberal, Neither
liberal nor conservative, Moderately conservative, Very conservativeg.
Attitudes Towards Science: This is a construct of 5 questions with fStrongly
disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, Strongly agreeg as available choices. The 5
questions in the construct were: (1) I strongly believe in science. (2) I believe
science can provide solutions to environmental problems. (3) I do not believe
science can provide solutions to social problems. (4) Science has caused more
problems than it has resolved. (5) I am reluctant to use technology (including
computers and models) to address complex natural and social problems.
While six dierent orders of presentation are possible for three sets of ques-
tions, it was decided that concentrating on just four orders provided the best
compromise between increasing the size of the subject pools for each order, and
exploring a variety of dierent possibilities:
Order A: fClimate Beliefs, Attitudes Towards Science, Political Aliationg,
Order B: fAttitudes Towards Science, Climate Beliefs, Political Aliationg,
Order C: fPolitical Aliation, Attitudes Towards Science, Climate Beliefsg,
Order D: fAttitudes Towards Science, Political Aliation, Climate Beliefsg
Participants were recruited nationally within Australia using an on-line re-
search only internet panel, administered by ORU, an online eldwork company
with QSOAP `Gold Standard' and the new Global ISO 26362 standard accredi-
tation. The online panel consisted of a group of community members who have
explicitly agreed to take part in web-based surveys from time to time. In return
they were oered a small non-cash incentives for completing the task, such as
points towards shopping credits. The selection process utilised by ORU guaran-
tees a sample that is strongly representative of the Australian population.
2.2 An Order Dependency for Climate Change Belief
All data analysis was performed using the R statistical environment [23]. The to-
tal number of respondents was 533, with An = 148 (27:7%); Bn = 131 (24:6%),
Cn = 132 (24:8%); Dn = 122 (22:9%), as the breakdown into the various order
categories. ORU split the demographics of the pools evenly across the four dif-
ferent orderings as far as was possible. Table 1 also compares the responses to
the Climate Beliefs question with the fourth CSIRO national survey [22], and
shows that the sampled respondents are generally representative of the larger
Australian population, although with a slight bias away from the \I don't think
that climate change is happening" response and towards \I have no idea whether
climate change is happening or not".
Climate change is: A B C D Total Study CSIRO
not happening 8 10 2 0 20 3.8% 7.6%
(1.04) (2.29) (-1.33) (-2.14)
I don't know 15 12 10 13 50 9.4% 6.3%
(0.30) (-0.08) (-0.68) (0.46)
happening but natural 60 53 47 43 203 38.1% 38.8%
(0.48) (0.44) (-0.46) (-0.51)
happening & human caused 65 56 73 66 260 48.8% 47.3%
(-0.85) (-0.99) (1.07) (0.84)
Total 148 131 132 122 533 (n=533) (n=5219)
Table 1. The contingency table for the question: What best describes your thoughts
about climate change? showing order of presentation in columns, response obtained
across rows, and Pearson residuals listed underneath in parentheses. The last two
columns compare responses to the Climate Beliefs question in the current study with
the fourth CSIRO national survey of Australian attitudes to Climate Change [22].
Questions exhibiting order dependencies were found using chi-square tests of
independence (Climate Beliefs, Political Aliation, and Attitudes to Science).
Each separate test of independence involved the four orders and the relevant re-
sponse category variables. Three signicant chi-square results were obtained: two
in the Climate Beliefs scale: \What best decribes your thoughts about climate
change?" (2(9; N = 533) = 17:89, p=0.036, Cramers's V = .105) and \How
important is the issue of climate change to you?" (2(12; N = 533) = 22:23,
p=0.035, Cramer's V = .118); as well as one question in the Attitudes towards
science scale: \I do not believe science can provide solutions to social problems"
(2(12; N = 533) = 21:07, p=0.049, Cramer's V = .115).
Fully understanding these signicant rejections of independence is dicult, as
many factors are involved. However, considering the dominant residuals reveals
a very interesting pattern. Firstly, we note that a strong contribution to the
signicant 2 values comes from the people who express the view that climate
change is not happening. Indeed, the top row of Table 1 is responsible for 70.8%
of the obtained value, with a further 19.9% arising from those who believe that
climate change is happening and human caused. A disproportionate amount of
the variance depends upon a comparatively small subset of the population (n=20,
or 3.8%), and three of the order categories for this response had expected values
just under 5 (Ae = 5:55; Be = 4:92; Ce = 4:95; De = 4:58, note that this table
still satises the standard assumption that 80% or more of the expected counts
should be larger than 5). This means that larger pool of denialists is required
before we can feel condent in declaring that we have indeed found an order
dependence for this question, however, paying careful attention to these two
response categories reveals an interesting pattern of behaviour that is somewhat
masked by the dominant eect of the top row. While orders A-B show a decrease
from the expected value of climate `believers', C-D show a slight increase in the
same subset. A similar but reversed pattern occurs for those who do not believe
that climate change is occurring. Reconsidering the question ordering reveals a
signicant dierence between these two categories; in C-D the Climate Beliefs
questions were asked last. Furthermore, turning our attention to the third row
of Table 1 (which lists the responses of those who think that climate change
is happening, but just a natural uctuation of the Earth's temperatures), we
see a set of residuals that exhibit the same f+;+; ; g signature, although
of a much smaller magnitude. This suggests that a merger of both denialist
positions (i.e. rows 1 and 3) could lead to a test for independence that was
less dependent upon the extreme denialist position. This aggregation leads to
a 2(6; N = 533) = 8:11 which is not signicant at the 5% level (p=0.230),
however, the same f+;+; ; g signature persists across the residuals. The other
two signicant results did not yield this intriguing signature.
It appears that framing a question about whether a subject believes in climate
change within a political and scientic context is having a weak impact upon the
response obtained. This framing results in a shift of subject responses towards
belief, with climate change `denialists' less likely to deny, and `believers' more
likely to believe that anthropogenic climate change is happening. Interestingly,
framing climate belief questions in just a scientic context appears to have the
opposite impact (as exhibited by order group B).
We propose an interaction between the Political Aliation and Attitudes
Towards Science is required, which would, when the two sets of questions are
combined, result in a slight bias towards belief in anthropogenic climate change.
A higher dimensional version of the model discussed in section 1.1 can describe
this eect, but alternative approaches are possible.
One such alternative model is based upon Quantum Decision Theory (QDT)
[20] and a recent renement called the QQ model [21]. Both models predict that
incompatibility between questions results when answering one question reframes
the perspective from which a subject will view the next one. Thus, both mod-
els would predict that the space in which people make decisions about climate
change expands in orders C-D, which moves them towards framing the question
in a dierent way (and so sometimes giving a dierent response). The model
proposed by Wang & Busemeyer [21] creates a very strong condition that must
be satised by quantum models. However, as a pure quantum model, it is highly
restrictive, and would rule out the time update proposed in equation (2) above.
Unfortunately, this model also requires that questions be asked consecutively,
with no intervening questions or information provided, which makes the appli-
cation of this test to surveys such as that discussed in section 2 dicult. In what
follows we will briey introduce the QQ model, before attempting to adapt the
current survey to a form where it might be applied in a three way scenario that
could eventually test between classical, pure quantum, and quantum-like models
of attitude change.
3 An Quantum Approach: the QQ Model
Denoting the projector representing the probability of responding yes to question
QA as PAy (similarly that of responding no as PAn) allows for an examination
of how dierent sets of questions aect a cognitive state in some larger attitude
space (let us assume this is a Hilbert space). According to the QQ Model pro-
posed by Wang & Busemeyer [21], a necessary condition for producing order
eects in a full quantum model is that a set of questions (for now call them QA
and QB) be non-commuting: PAyPBn 6= PBnPAy. This reects the manner in
which asking question QA creates a comparative context for further questions (in
this case question QB). The rst question (in this case QA) is denoted as a non-
comparative context. This allows for the denition of the comparative context in
which a question (say QB) was asked:
TPQB   P (By) = 2  P (AyBy)  2AB
p
P (By) 
p
P (Ay); (4)
where P (: : : ) is the probability of the given response (yes or no) to the question
denoted (QA or QB), TPB = P (AyBy)+P (AnBy) is the probability of answer-
ing yes to question QB in the comparative context of question QA, and AB is
the similarity between the two questions as represented by their projections:
AB =
P (AyBy)  TPQB + P (By)
2
p
P (By) pP (Ay) : (5)
4 A Three-way Scenario
The data from Table 1 suggests that a dual comparative context of Attitudes to
science and Political aliation shifts subjects towards a higher rate of belief in
climate change, across both denialist and belief positions.
Wang & Busemeyer rightly claim that the QQ model makes strong predic-
tions for a three question scenario [21]. For example, the similarity parameters
for three consecutive questions A;B and C should satisfy a triangle equality:
AB + BC = AC : (6)
This is a very interesting requirement, and it allows for a strong test to see if a
system is exhibiting the fully quantum behaviour predicted by the QQ model.
We propose that a strong test of whether the QQ model applies to attitude
change (in particular attitudes to climate change) could be constructed by tak-
ing three questions from the above survey and asking them consecutively. We
propose that three questions from the above survey have a high likelyhood of
revealing a signicant order eect in the protocol required by the QQ model:
A: What best describes your thoughts about climate change?
B: Please indicate how you identify your political views.
C: I do not believe science can provide solutions to social problems.
If asking A;B, and C in the six possible orders reveals a signicant order eect
then applying the QQ model would enable a determination of whether this was
due to quantum behaviour. Indeed, if the similarity measure between each of
these questions satises (6) then this would be a very strong proof that the sys-
tem was exhibiting the quantum behaviour expected by the QQ model, severely
restricting the form of time evolution exhibited by this system.
However, it is important to realise that the quantum-like behaviour exhibited
by the QQ model is of a purely quantum form, and that there is no a priori
reason why this system might not violate classical probability (hence reveal
quantum-like behaviour), but fail to satisfy the QQ model. Indeed, the time
evolution model proposed in [14] (and briey introduced in section 1.1) is not of
a standard quantum form, although it is unitary in nature [12]. We would not
expect a system that exhibits this behaviour to satisfy the QQ model.
This allows for a compelling test to be performed that would allow for a deter-
mination of what type of mathematical model this system of attitudes actually
satisfy. Thus, the experiment proposed above would provide a straightforward
way of determining whether the system of interrelating attitudes exemplied
by climate change belief, attitudes towards science, and political aliation is
quantum, quantum-like or classical in nature.
4.1 Limitations of the QQ Model
While the QQ model provides a very powerful battery of tests that can be used to
determine whether a system is exhibiting quantum behaviour, it does face some
limitations. Firstly, and perhaps most pertinent to the present study, it is not
particularly relevant to general survey scenarios. These usually consist of scales
with multiple questions, and multiple responses, and so a direct application of
the QQ model is generally not possible for such real world scenarios. Secondly,
satisfaction of the QQmodel requires that the system under consideration exhibit
what we might term exact quantum behaviour. This is a very strong requirement,
and many quantum-like models have been proposed in the QI community that
do not have such a pure quantum form. The attitude model discussed above is
just one such example, but Khrennikov also proposes models unlikely to satisfy
this requirement (see e.g. [24]). A further battery of tests needs to be created,
and perhaps most usefully, we envisage a hierarchy of tests that could be applied
to a system exhibiting contextual behaviour, with an associated classication of
the system as quantum, quantum-like and classical. Finally, we note that even a
fully quantum system might not satisfy the QQ model if the associated subspaces
cannot be represented in one space (as is the case with momentum and spin in
a standard quantum system). We anticipate that this is highly likely to occur in
many complex contextual systems, and so it is important that the model only
be applied in the correct circumstances.
5 Conclusions
Even small eects such as the one discussed in this paper could prove highly
signicant in the modern world (e.g. in a very close election that has a focus
upon the issue of climate change). Politicians already know that governments
rise or fall on their ability to sell highly emotive issues such as climate change
within the `right' context. Indeed, Australian elections since the mid-1970's have
always been won by a margin4 of less than 10%, which means that an eect of the
size reported here (slightly over 10%) would prove signicant for any election
fought on the issue of climate change. We note that the last two Australian
federal elections have indeed featured climate change policy as a key dividing
issue between the two major parties, and this issue is likely to become more
controversial as the eects of climate change become more severe. However,
few techniques exist for analysing the way in which public issues are framed
in public debates. This means that the signature discovered in the residuals
analysis performed in section 2.2 oers a intriguing statistical approach that
merits further investigation in its own right.
It is essential that quantum inspired models become more applicable to real
modelling problems. Many of the tests and models so far proposed have con-
sidered simple datasets with a small number of incompatible measurements, or
toy models in low dimensional spaces. However, the rise of big data opens up
many opportunities, and with a new battery of complex models and tests that
can be applied to real world datasets and problems we would nd many more
opportunities to progress.
This paper has provided an initial discussion of a real world dataset that
exhibits an interesting order eect. This exploratory data was collected in the
hope that it could be used to prime a quantum-like model of attitude change
in a social context, and indeed it provides a baseline step towards this goal.
Attempting to understand the order eect obtained by performing a standard
2 analysis has left us with a proposal for a strong experimental test, which
could determine if the time evolution that was exhibited by this system should
be considered quantum (as is exemplied by the QQ model), quantum like, or
classical in nature. Future work will be devoted to performing this experiment
and analysing its results.
Acknowledgements: We thank Peter Bruza for his many contributions to early
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